|
Beyond their obvious differences, both the World Trade Organization
(WTO) at the global level, as the European Union (EU) and the Common Market
of the South (Mercosur) at the regional level, seem to share similar challenges.
They involve preserving their relevance by adapting to the new global
and regional realities which are, as we know, very different from those
of their founding moments.
They are adaptation requirements centered mainly on methodological issues
related with the mechanisms and tools that allow them to achieve the objectives
for which they were created through decisions that are effective and penetrate
reality.
But in all three cases these methodological issues tend, at times, to
refer back to existential questions. These reflect the doubts of the member
countries -and even more so of those who have to make decisions for productive
investment and, in particular, the respective citizens- on the validity
of the objectives that led to the founding pact or, at least, on the possibility
of achieving them within the current institutional frameworks. These objectives
are linked especially with global governance at the level of international
trade (in the case of the WTO) or with the respective regional governance
(for both EU and Mercosur), the latter conceived as the creation of conditions
of peace, democracy and political stability and economic and social development
in the geographic space shared by its members.
The stagnation of the Doha Round and the trends towards the fragmentation
of the international trading system as a result of the proliferation of
initiatives for mega- interregional preferential trade agreements (such
as the Trans-Pacific Trade Partnership- TPP- and the Transatlantic Trade
and Investment Partnership - TATIP-), are some of the more obvious symptoms
of the problems of efficacy and, therefore, of relevance, being faced
by the WTO. All this at a time when the effects of the current international
financial and economic crisis on world trade are still severe, with the
ensuing impact of traditional and also novel forms of protectionism of
the markets accessed by a large number of the member countries.
In such context, Ambassador Roberto de Azevêdo will initiate on
September 1 his mandate as new Director General of the WTO. He will succeed
Pascal Lamy, who held that position for eight years. Lamy's vast international
experience and personal and technical prestige were not sufficient to
achieve the success he sought in the difficult task of coordinating the
negotiating positions of countries with such different interests and power
resources. Azevêdo is knowledgeable of the negotiating arena of
Geneva and the art of economic diplomacy. The fact that he was appointed
after an interesting selection process, which originally included nine
candidates with outstanding backgrounds, speaks volumes of his reputation
as a diplomat and this will help him in his role. But, in particular,
it also shows the new realities of world power. The fact that he was not
the candidate favored by the countries that since the inception of GATT
had been the main protagonists when making key decisions and that, on
the contrary, the developing countries were the ones who most influenced
his selection, clearly shows that the WTO is no longer what it was when
it was created in Marrakech.
The new Director General will have little time to influence the outcome
of the Ministerial Conference to be held in early December in Bali (Indonesia).
Despite the notable efforts made by Pascal Lamy, there are still strong
doubts whether any meaningful results will be achieved in this opportunity.
But the fact that there is now an awareness that the effects -even political
ones in terms of global governance- that a meager Bali could have on the
future of the WTO and on its effectiveness as the ambit for international
trade negotiations that are relevant, could contribute to finally make
headway in laying out a roadmap for the future -a credible 'post-Bali
agenda'.
The recent report on ´The Future of Trade: The Challenges of Convergence´,
provides significant elements for the layout of such an agenda. In this
sense, it is part of the valuable legacy of the Lamy period. Other legacies
relate to the obvious gains that have been evinced for example in the
area of (i) transparency -reflected by a quality website- and in particular
on the trade policies applied by member countries; (ii) the mechanism
for dispute settlement, and (iii) the understanding of the transformations
that are taking place in the modalities of international trade of goods
and services, as well as their link with productive investments and economic
development -reflected by the concept 'made in the world' and in the continuous
teaching that the Director General has made through his lectures on multiple
occasions and in very different locations.
Thinking of Bali, it should be noted that a major problem may be the
fact that the US in particular does not seem very interested in restoring
the relevance of the multilateral system of international trade. If in
fact there is an interest, it has failed to show it convincingly. On the
contrary, President Obama's administration seems to be more focused on
promoting the new generation of mega-interregional preferential trade
agreements. The recent presidential trip to Mexico seems to enroll in
such a strategy. Such mega-deals would be regarded as a more interesting
alternative due to their possible WTO-plus content and perhaps, ultimately,
as a way to pressure some of the major emerging nations to finally accept
a 'Doha-plus' negotiation.
Even the prestigious and influential specialist Professor Richard Baldwin
(see the reference to his recent article in the Recommended Reading section
of the April 2013 edition of this Newsletter) has advanced the idea of
a WTO 2.0, more adapted to what he considers to be the new realities of
world trade. This includes a membership limited to the few countries that,
in his opinion, are relevant in a world in which the exchange of goods
and services is channeled largely through transnational value chains.
The investments which these value chains give rise to would require the
negotiation of regulatory frameworks and effective measures to protect
them and, above all, to protect the knowledge and intelligence built into
the respective goods and services. However, he does not analyze -at least
in the referred article- the geopolitical implications of his proposal,
especially in terms of global governance. Neither does he explain how
transnational value chains have been able to develop in recent years,
although there were no mega-interregional preferential trade agreements
such as the ones being promoted, nor, of course, the WTO 2.0 existed.
In order to be successful Azevêdo will need the full active support
of all those countries that opted for him in the last stretch of the selection
process. It is a stage in which what will be valuable will be the contribution
of practical ideas and of sufficient political power to help conclude
Bali with a projected roadmap for the future aimed at renewing the objectives
and working methods of the WTO. In this regard, and as noted by Pascal
Lamy when presenting the above-mentioned report on the future of trade,
the key word is convergence. According to this report, there are four
levels at which such convergence should be sought: the level of trade
policies of member countries; of the multilateral system with the different
preferential schemes; of the trade policies and other internal policies
of countries; and of the trade policies with other non-tariff public measures.
These four levels of convergence will require a great capacity for agreeing
concerted national interests. It will not be easy considering also the
limited powers that have been attributed to the Director General of the
WTO until now. But what and independent international official, who has
no allegiance to any country or group of countries in particular, can
bring in is an overall view and ideas that can help reconcile sometimes
very divergent national interests.
Of course, the art of reaching agreement requires a pre-requisite: that
the different countries know what they want and what they can achieve
in an international context in deep and constant change, where there is
no longer room for the practice of what Professor Bertrand Badie, from
Science Po Paris, has aptly termed the 'diplomacy of connivence' (see
the Spanish translation of his book in the Recommended Reading section,
with the provocative title 'Diplomacia del Contubernio').
In this regard, Roberto Azevêdo has a great opportunity -and a
great challenge- to highlight the contribution that the capacity for concerted
action can bring to the necessary global governance. It will be crucial
that in the performance of his duties he is perceived as someone who is
committed to all and not just to one country or group of countries in
particular. He needs to have something like the quality that Jean-Christophe
Rufin attributes to Jacques Coeur, the protagonist of his historic novel
Le Grand Coeur (Gallimard, Paris 2012) and which is his ability to see
everything from above, like a bird's eye view ('comme le ferait un oiseau').
Perhaps it was Jean Monnet who best reflected in contemporary terms that
quality. With his actions and ideas he made a decisive contribution to
help post-war Europe find a roadmap that now it would seem, at times,
tempted to abandon.
|
